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RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES.
BY CHARLrS CHAUNC.ZY BiNsmY, Esg.
IV.
LOCAL OPTION AS AFFECTED BY THE RESTRICTIONS.
IT is a settled general rule of constitutional law that
the power to make laws' cannot be delegated by the legis-
lature to any other body in the community,- nor even to
the whole body of citizens. Under our State constitutions
this power is conferred upon the legislature as the sole
responsible law-making body, and any transfer of the
power and its attendant responsibilities to other hands than
those in which the constitution has placed it, would disturb
" that balanceof power which is essential to-the proper and
advantageous working of the several departments of. the
government.2
'Legislative power should be carefully distinguished from that of
administration, which must necessarily he delegated in every case, and
the exercise of which often involves a very wide discretion on the part of
the party entrusted therewith, a discretion sometimes so.great as to
resemble legislative power itself. Thus, the authority granted to railroad -
and warehouse commissioners to fix equal and reasonable rates, though
very extensive, is only administrative, and shduld not be confused with
legislative power: State v. C. M. & St. P. P. Co., 38 ]Xinn., 281. And
so of the power to select a site for a public building: Peop. v. Dunn, 8o
-Cl., 21.
:I Cooley, Const. Lims. (6th ed.), 137: ",The legislature neither must
nor can transfer the power of making laws to anyone else, or place it
anywhere but where the people have:" Locke on Civil Govt., 142.
See, in general, Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal., 279; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr.
(Del.), 479; Santo v. State, 210., x65; Geebrick v. State, 5 id., 491; State
v. Beneke, 9 id., 203; State v. Weir, 33 id., 134; Ailditor v. Holland, 14
Bush (Ky.), 147; State v. Field, 17 Mo., 529; State v. Wright, 45 id.,
458; Lammert v. Lidwell, 82.id., i88; Peop. v. Collins, 3 Mich., 343;
Paul v. Gloucester Co., 50 N. J. L., 585, 593; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y.,
483; Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. (N. Y.), 112; Bradley v. Baxter, id., 122;
C. W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commrs., 10. St., 77; Locke's App., 72 Pa., 491;
State v. Copeland, 3 R. I., 33; Willis V. Owen, 43 Tex., 4i; State v.
Parker, 26 Vt., 357, 362.
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The passage of a bill containing a proviso that it shall
not take effect as a law, unless the people so determine by
a vote, is regarded as an attempted delegation of legisla-
tive power, and by the great preponderance of authority
no such referendum can be allowed in the United States,'
except in cases where a State constitution may. have ex-
pressly authorized it;' and, perhaps, also, as to the date
when a law is to go into effect,' unless any of the dates
proposed be so remote that postponement amounts to re--
jection.'
At the same time a legislature.may, in its discretion,
pass a law in ikraesenti to take effect infuluro on the hap-
p~ning of certain contingencies,- and the fact that such
IBarto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y., 483, overruling Johnson v. Rich, 9 Barb.,t
68o; and see cases cited in lastnote. In State v. Parker, 26 Vt., 357, however,
RUDomrLD, C. J., denied that. there was any proper distinction .between
the result of an election and the other contingencies on which a law
could rightly be made to depend.- "It makes no essential difference
what is the nature of the contingency, so it be an equal' and fair one, a
moral and legal one, not opposed to sound policy, and so far connected •
with the object and purpose of the statute as not to be a mere idle and
arbitrary one. ..... .. It seems to me that the distinction attempted
between the contingency of a popular vote and other future contingencies'
is without all just foundation in sound policy br sound reasoning, and
that it has too often been made' more from necessity than from choice,
rather to escape from an overwhelming analogy than from any obvious
difference in principle in the two classes of cases."
The general vote, provided for in the law then in question, was not,,
however, upon the acceptance or rejection of the law, but merely as to
whether it sliould take effect at once or be deferred till another le~isla- •
ture should meet, and have an opportunity of reconsidering it. The
decision, therefore, can har.dlybe regarded as a precedent for the doctrine
on which it was based.-
The cage of Smith'v. Janesville, 26 Wis., 291, deciding that a law
taxing bank-stock, affecting the people of the whole State,; could be sub.
mitted to the voters of the State at large, would seem to have been-
tacitly overruled in Slinger v. Henneman, 38 Wis., 504. For a full con-
sideration of this subject, see Cooley's Const. Lims. (6th ed.1, i4o, etc.
2State v. Young, 29 Minn., 559. For instances of this special
authorization, see Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y., 483. In case delegation of
power be authorized, it can be done only within the limits specified:
Waterhouse v. Pub. Schools, 9 Bax. (Tenn.), 398.
3 StatV v. Parker, 26 Vt., 357.
4 This effect of the postponement was probably the cause of the
division of opinion of the court in Peop. v. Collins, 3 Mich., 343.
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contingencies may never arise, and the law may never take
effect at all, is held not to impair its validity as a legisla-
tive act. Such a law is not incomplete, the only matter
not absolutely determined by the legislature being the ex-
pediency of its going into operation, and even this is
determined, as far as possible, by being made contingent
upon th ehappening of a certain event, or the existence of
certain circumstances.' Thus, in the leading case of Brig
Aurora v. U. S.,' the Non-intercourse Acts of 18o9 and suc-
ceeding years were upheld, though they provided that in
case either France or Great Britain should so modify their
edicts, that they should cease to violate the neutral com-
merce of the United States, thie President should proclaim
the fact, and trade should be resumed.
There are certain subjects of such a character that the
operation of laws in regard to them is necessarily depen-"
dent, in whole or in part, upon the action of those who
may be affected by the laws, and in such cases the willing-
ness of the parties concerned to accept the law, or adopt or
avail themselves of its provisions ,may properly constitute
the fact or contingency upon which its operation depends.
I Brig Aurora v. U. S., 7 Cr. (U. S.), 382; Lothrop v. Stedman, 42
Conn., 583; State v. N. H. & N. R. Co., 43 id., 351; Burlington v. Leebrick,
43'10. 252; Walton v. Greenwood, 6o Me., 356; Baltimore v. Clunet, 23
Md., 449; State v. Kirkley, 29 id., 85; Peck v. Weddell, 17 0. St., 271;
State v. Parker, 26 Vt., 357; Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. (Va.), 78.
So a municipal ordinance may be made to take effect in case of the
existence or occurrence of facts germane to its subject matter (State v.
Kirkley, 29 Md., 85), or on the happening 'f a future contingent event,
even one involving assent by other parties to the provisions of the
ordinance: Baltimore v. N. C. P. Co., 21 Md.,' 93; Baltimore v. Clunet, 23
Md., 449.
27 Cr. (U. S.), 382: The doctrine of this case was recently re-affirmed
in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S., 649, a case involing the so-called "reci
procity clause" of the Act of October i, x8go. Th6 third sectioni of that
act declared it to be the duty of the Piesident to suspend the provisions
of the free list, as far as concerned any country producing and exporting
certain articles, whenever he sh6uld be satisfied that the duties levied
by such country on certain American imports were reciprocally unequal
and inreasonable. The Supreme Court (FuLuwR, C. J., and LAMAR, J.,
dissenting) declared that this was not an attempt to confer legislative
power upon the President.
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Thus, where special acts of incorporation are allowed, the
corporate powers or franchises cannot be forced upon the
corporators; they must be allowed the option of accepting
or rejecting them.1  A general corporation law works in
the same way, for it does not of itself bring a single cor-
poration into existence. When the corporators voluntarily
take the steps required by the law, then, and not -till then,
is the corporation formed. The special law has, no binding
force whatever until accepted, and may never take effect at
all; and though the general. law is regarded as taking effect
without the need of any such aceeptance, yet the extent of
its operation is limited by the number of persons who de-
cide that it shall operate upon them, and it, too, might con-
ceivably fail to operat6 at all, simply because no one chose
to make use of it.
Another conspicuous instance of the exercise of an
option in regafd to the operation of a statute is seen in the
case of laws affecting local affairs. Such laws, even if
general, cannot operate throughout the whole State, but
are necessarily restricted to ' those localities where the' cir- -
cumstances exist to which the laws apply, and local self-
government requires that in many instances the existence'
of these circumstances must depend upon the wishes of the
people or the action of the local authorities.2  The legisla-
ture, for instance, provides appropriate forms of local goy-
ernment for the various classes of municipalities, and can,
from time t6 time, authorize the exercise of additional
powers* on their part, but the localities themselves are
usually left to determine when.to adopt the forms of gov-
ernment oi exercise'the powers provided.
Where iowers of administration alone are granted, the
question for the people to determine at any time is, not
whether the law shall be in force or remain in abeyance,
but merely whether the powers granted shall be exercised
'King v. Pasmore, 3 Term, 240; Bailey v. Mayor of N. Y., 3 Hill
(N. Y.), 53'; Shortz v. Unangst, 2 W. & S. (Pa.), 45.
2 Cooley's Const. Lims. (6th ed.), 138; State v. District Court, 33
Minn., 235; State v. O'Neill, 24 Wis., 149; Slinger v. Henneman, 38 id.,
5o4, and cases cited in the following notes.
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at that time, and the vote to be taken or the ordinance to
be passed before the power is exercised, are simply the proper
means of expressing the wish and intention to exercise the
power. Thus, the power to tax for certain purposes,' to hold
the bonds or to subscribe to the stock of railroad companies,
2
to erect buildings,' to establish schools,4 to divide or con-
solidate counties, townships, or school districts,* to locate
county seats 6-- these and many like powers 7 may be granted
"subject to the right of any community to which the law
applies to avail itself of the power as the citizens or the
authorities may deem best. The law in such a case exists
in full force from the date of its enactment. The localities
affected actually have the powers granted, without further
action on their part. It is only the *exercise of the power
that needs the sanction of a vote or an ordinance.
The choice involved in regard to the establishment of
police regulations is somewhat different, especially where
the choice is between two different systems of regulations,
as in the case of "local option" laws, which provide that
the citizens of any one or more couties or other political
divisions of a State shall, 6r may, periodically, decide by
vote whether the sale of liquor shall.be licensed or not, the
system of license provided by such law being simply in-
operative during any period in the localities which vote
against license for that period, and a system of prohibition
taking its place. The same system is sometimes applied to
'Steward v. Jefferson, 3 Harr. (Del.), 335; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill
(Md.), xi.
2 Hobart v. Supervisors, 17 Cal., 23;. Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 id., 379;
L. M. & B. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind., 185.
3 Comth. v. Painter, io Pa., 214.
So of other public works: Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. (N- Y.), 33.
Similarly, an act creating a board of trustees with authority to select
a site for a public building is not a delegation of legislative power: Pe6p.
v. Dunn, 8o Cal., 211.
4 Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. (Va.), 78.
5 Peop. v. Nally, 49 Cal., 478; State v. Reynolds, io Ill., i; Call v.
Chadbourne, 46 Me., 206; State v. -Scott, 17 Mo., 521; Opinion of Judges,
55 id., 295; Comth. v. Judges, 8 Pa., 391.
6 State v. Supervisors, 24 Wis., 49.
7 Lytle v. May, 49 1o., 221; Des Moines v. Hillis, 55 id., 643; Werner
v. Galveston, 72 Tex., 22.
I
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herding and fence laws 1 and other matters.2 In such a case
the law is in force whatever thevote may be, for.whether the
tegulation established be that of suppressing or merely of
regulating, it is derived equally from the law in either case.
.Such a lav must, of course, be complete in itself, ready to.
take effect in accordance with the wish of the .people of
each locality as soon as that wish is expressed in the man-
ner provided by law. This being so, though some courts
at one time held such a law to derive its efficacy from the
popular vote, and not. from the legislature,; the weight of
modern authority would uphold it as an exercise of the
xight of local self-government within limits prescribed by the
legislature, and deriving iis force from the legislature alone.4
In the case of laws providing forms of local govern-
ment or granting additional powers to local governments
,already established, the choice made by the people or local
.authorities does, in a sense, determine whether or not' the
law shall be in force in the locality concerned. Still- it ig
not an exercise of legislative power, an enactment of the law
for that locality, but only a determination of the conditions
-on the existence of which the operation of the.law depends.'
I Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 Ill., 94; Cain V. Commrs., 86 N. C., 8; John-
-son v. Mocabee (Okla., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep., 336.2 For a law making bowling alleys a nuisance under certain circum.-
-stances, see State v. Moyers, io Fost. (N. H.), 279.
3Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal., 279; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. (Del.), 479,
Maize v. State, 4 Ind., 342; Meshmeier v. State, ii id., 482; Geebrick v.
-State, 5 Ia., 491; State v. Weir, 33 id., 134; Parker v. Comth., 6 Pa., 507.
SBoyd v. Bryant, 35 Ark., 69; State v. Wilcox, 42 Conn., 364C Fell
-v. State, 42 Md., 71; Comth. v. Bennett, io8 Mass., 27; Comth. v. Dean,
xxo id., 357;. State v. Cooke, 24 Minn., 247; State v. Morris Com. Pleas,
36 N. J. L., 72; Gloversville v. Howell, 7o N. Y., 287; Locke's App., 72'
Pa., 49t; Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt., 456. Even where such a law .
applies to every county or township in the State, yet, the vote being
-taken by each locality for itself, this is held a different thing from a
-delegation of the control of the liquor traffic to'all the people of the
State in one body: Paul v. Gloucester Co., 5o N.J. L., 583, 666.
5 Peop. v. Salomon, 51 Ill., 37, 53; Patterson v. Society, 24 N. J. L.,
385; Bank v. Brown, 26 N. Y., 467; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa., 359; Dil-
Ion's Mun. Corp., 44.
In New York it seems, to have been at one time thought that such a
-case was within the rule of Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y., 483, cited sufira;
TPeop. v. Stout, 23 Barb., 349.
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As a direct vote of the people of a locality in regard
to acts' authorized by laws regulating local affairs, or in
,regard to the operation of such laws, is not an exercise of
delegated legislative power, neither ij the passage of ordi-
nanc/s, under the authority of municipal charters or
general municipal corporation. laws, an exercise of such
power. As all ordinances in regard to municipal matters,
properly passed and not contravening the laws of the State,
have the same forte within the municipality as the laws of
'the State itself, it is often said that a power to legislate for
local purposes is "delegated" to municipal corporations,
and that such bodies can pass "laws." Strictly speaking,
however, municipal ordinances are not acts of legislation.
The charter, or the general municipal corporation law, as.
the case may be, is the legislative act which alone gives to
these ordinances their vitality. They simply determine
the manner in which and the extent to which the powers.
granted by that act shall operate.' In the case of purely
administrative powers, the ordinance "which determines.
their exercise has not even the appearance of legislation.
It is merely the decision to do an act the power to do which
has been grdnted by legislation, "and this is so even where
the ordinance concerns the adoption of the proVisions of
an act of the legislature.
This brief statement bf the constitutionality of laws
allowing some form of option in regard to the regulation
of local affairs has been made without reference to an
I Ex parle Wall, 48 Cal., 279; Exfparle Chin Yan, 6o id., 78; State-
v. Tryon, 39 Conn., 183; Perdue v. Ellis, iS Ga., 586; Hill v. Decatur, 22
id., 203; Mason v. Shaweetown, 77 Ill., 533; Covington v. E. St. Louis,
78 id., 348; Indianapolis v. Ind. Gas Co., 6 Ind., 396; Des Moines Gas
Co. v. Des Moines, 44 1o., 505; Starr v. Burlington, 45 id., 87; Des.
Moines v. Hillis, 55 id., 643; Heland v. Lowell, 3 All. (Mass.), 407; Paul
v. Coulter, 12 Minn., 41; Metcalf v. St. Louis, i i Mo., io3; St. Louis v.
Boffinger, ig id., 13; Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 id., io5; St. Louis v. Bank,.
49 id., 574; St. Louis v. Foster,-52 id., 513; State v. Clark, 28 N. H., 176;.
Paul v. Gloucester Co., 50 N.J. L., .585. Jones v. Ins. Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.),
307; McDermott v. Police, 5 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 422; Gloversville v.
Howell, 70 N. Y., 287; Markle v. Akron, 14 0., 586, 59o; Comth. v.
Duquet, 2 Yea. (Pa.), 493; Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Cold. (Tenn.), 382;-
•Dillon's Mun. Corps., 308.
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important factor which has of late entered into the con-
.sideration of the question, viz.,, that of the restrictions
-upon local and special legislation.' In point of fact, the
propriety of local option within certain limits was estab-
lished before any such restrictions had been imposed.
except ina very few States. In these, however, while it
did not escape. notice that local option might produce the
effect of local legislation hand be equally within the restric-
tions, the argument which evidently weighed most deeply.
with the courts was that which treated the laws under
consideration as delegations of legislative power.1  After,
the propriety *of local option for certain purposes .had been
'niversally' admitted, the question of its producing the
effect of local legislation could for the first time be con-
sidered independently, and as such legislation came to
be restricted ini one State after another, it became a prac-
tical question *whether an' option given to the different
localities or municipalities to accept or avail themselves of'
a law was or was not in effect legislation for those which,
accepted or availed themselves'of it, to ,the exclusion -of
those which did not, and in the case of an option between
alternative provisions, whether there did not result 'one law
for certain communities and another law for other similar
ones. In answering this question, it is to be remembered
that "a law must be regarded as general or special at the
time of its enactment;" 2 its subsequent general adoption
or partial rejectibn cannot be allowed to determine in
which category it is to be placed. The legislature, which
alone can pass the 'laws of the commonwealth, can alone
give to a law its'character. This' must be admitted,
whether the possibility of a partial rejection of a law be
taken into account or not. Whatever effect this be. held
to have, it has from the start.
Where the option allowed by a law concerns merely
the exercise of a power granted by such law to all locali-
ties which desire to exercise it, the question of local legis-
1 See Maize v. State, 4'Ind., 342; Geebrick v. State, 5 10., 491.
In re Cleveland, 5i 'N. J. L., 311.
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lation cannot arise unless such exercise involves a departure
from a system already established by general law, a matter
which will be referred to later on. In the ordinary case of
the exercise of a power of local administration, the law
being in effect everywhere, and requiring no adoption, the
question for the locality to decide is merely whether or not
the power granted by the law shall be exercised for the
particular purpose then under consideration; If, in conse-
quence of such option, the exercise of a power be author-
ized, it is exercised under a law which was in force in thft
locality just as much before the vote as afterwards. 1
Similarly in regard to systems of local government,
the vote of a community to organize as a borough or a
city, as the case may be, brings into existence new com-
munities upon which the general laws regulating municipal
government can operate, and is, in fact, the only practicable
mbde of determining what form of government the com-
munity shall have. Moreover, as a general law does not
repeal existing special laws' in regard to the same matter,'
L. M. & B. .R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind., 185: State v. Wilcox, 45
Mo., 358; Noonan v. County of Hudson, 52 N.J. L., 398; affirming s. c.,
51 id., 454. The last case involved an act providing that when the board
of freeholders of any county should deem it best to construct a public
road extending through such county, they should submit the matter to a
vote, and if approved by the majority, the freeholders should have
power to construct the road and issue bonds to pay for it. The act was
held to be general, and not local, on the authority of Paul v. Gloucester
Co., 5o'N. J. L., 585; Warner v. Hoagland, 51 id., 66; and In re Cleve-
land, id., 311, infra, which denied the necessity of uniform systems of
'police regulations or local government. It would seem, however,
that the decision did not need the support of those cases, and is dis-
tinguishable from them. The vote in Noonan v. County of Hudson was
not on the adoption of the law itself or of any part of it, but simply on
the exercise of power granted by the law. The act did not, it is true,
do away with the other methods of laying out county roads, but it
applied equally to all counties, and. while the coexistence of various
methods of effecting the same end may be criticised as tending to diver-
sity of administration, this is not the same as diversity of local govern-
ment, and the placing of any given method of administration, (though
coexistent with others) within the power of any county at any time can
hardly be objected to as local legislation.
2 See prior article on "The Distinctions between General, Local an
Special Legislation.-
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unless such repeal be expressly provided for, a law pro-
viding a uniform system of a city government, applichble
to a class of cities and binding upon all future members, is
general, although it may leave it oftional with the exist-
ing members which are governed by special laws to adopt.
the new system at any tme or not. All such cities have
the opportunity of accepting the general act, those which
do not simply remain as before, while the acceptance by
any of them from time to time will simply extend the
operation of the general act, and cannot possibly effect
any special or local result.'
On the same principle a township organization law, to
take effect in each county as soon as adopted by it, is
general.' To force the township system upon all counties,
whether they wished it or not, would violate the principles.
of self-government, while the option can never be.exercised
so as to diminish the sphere of operation of the system,
but only so as to increase it. 'The same reasoning sistains
an act ,authorizing- thie governing body of cities of the-
first class to appoint a board of police commissioners,
either of their own motion or on petition of 2oo bona fide
householders.'
Whether proper local self-government requires or
makes desirable a choice between different systems of
police regulation, or local government or administration, so-.,
that a law providing for such a choice must, from the
nature of thd case, be regarded as general, is a very differ-
I Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa., 328, overruling s. c., 120 id., 198.
The meagerly reported Pennsylvania case of Kneeland v. Pittsburgh,
io Cent. A., 421, sustaining a law regulating pedlar's licenses in cities of
the secondand third classes, but not to go into effect in any such city,
"until councils accept the same by ordinance," seems to have been
decided on the same ground. Its effect was to extend to the cities of
those classes which should desire it the powers possessed by the authori-
ties of the only city of the first class, and so gradually to con-form all to
the same system.
Opinion of Judges, 55 Mo., 295, decided in 1874. The constitution
of 1875 (Art. IX, 8) specifically authorizes the enactment of such a-
law.
9 State v. Hunter, 38 Kan. 575.
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ent question. In some cases the exercise of such an option
works the partial repeal of a general law already in force
and such partial repeal, whether expressly forbidden in the
State constitution of not, must be regarded as a form of
local legislation. Moreover, whether the circumstance of
a partial repeal be involved or not, such an option unques-
tionably impairs the uniforni operation of all laws of the
State upon the subject as to which the option is exercised.
In Florida, where.the constitution requires that laws regu-
lating municipal government shall be not only general but
uniform, it is held that no diversities of government can
be allowed, even if the same option be granted to every
member of the class to which the law applies. A system
once established for a class, its members cannot be allowed
to decide by ordinance, each one for itself, whether or not
it shall be governed by another system. "The govern-
ment in each class must be the same, and such must be
'the result of the action of the legislature independent of
the contingency of local discretion or option in the prem-
ises." '
Under this doctrine, too, the possibility that all may
make the same choice does not affect the matter. "The
SMcConihe v. State, 17 Fla., 238. Even apart from the question of
local option the classification contemplated by the law was inadmissible,
because it was made to depend on existing or temporary circumstances
only. The new class was to be composed of cities then containing i6oo
-registered voters, which cities were to accept the law by ordinance
passed before the next general election.. As to the law on both these
points, neither of which were noticed by the Court, see the prior article
on "Classification."
In the somewhat analogous case of State z. Stark, i Fla., 2,5. it was
held that the legislature could not pass a law authorizing one half the
bondholders of any city., whose bonds were~passed due and' unpaid, to
,.petition the Governor to declare the corporation dissolved, after which
declaration twenty residents could petition for its reorganization on a
new system. The decision rested mainly on the ground that the legisla-
ture must itself establish a system of municipal government, and could
not leave it to the discretion of bondholders or residents. The fact that
the existence of such discretion as to the form of the government of
defaulting cities was, however, alluded to as preventing the necessary
uniformity of the system proposed for such cities, a view in accordance
with the doctrine of McConihe v. State.
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test is not results but possibilities," and uniform operation
must, be established beyond the possibility of an excep-.
tion, as it otherwise "would be the result of chance and
not of the operation of a fixed rule prescribed by the legis-
lature, while the constitution contemplates nfo such con-
tingency.." 1
The constitution of Pennsylvania does not in terms
require uniformity of municipal government, but the pro-
hibition of local and special legislation is regarded as equiv-
alent to a requirement of uniformity, diversity being one of
the evils sought to be cured by this prohibition.. It is held
in that State' that if local or special results either are or "
may be'produced by a law, such law is not general, and
hence that any change in the general municipal corpora-,
tion law cannot be limited to affect only those cities that,
may adopt the new act. Even if all cities shouldadopt
the change, this would not affect the matter, both because
an act must be general or special at the time of its passage,'
and 'because its uniform operation must be established
beyond the possibility of a doubt.2  As the Supreme
Court recently said of certain acts providing for the elec-
tion of an officer charged with the enforcement of muni-
cipal ordin nces, "They. are local because confined in their
operation to cities-of a specified population, which shall
accept them by ordinance duly adopted by councils and
approved by the Mayor. Whether they shall apply to a
city of the dlass described depends on the action of its
municipal officers, and in consequence thereof one city of
the class may be subject to their provisions, and other
.cities of the same class be exempt from them.3
On the same principle a law has been held local in
Illinois, providing for the collection of city taxes by a
system materially different from that previously in force,
but authorizing any city council to collect the taxes, either
McConihe v. State, 17 F~la., 238.
2 Scranton School District's App., 113 Pa., 178; Commonwealth v.
Reynolds, 137 id., 389.
3 Commonwealth v. Denworth, 145 Pa., 172.
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under the oldlawor the new, as it might at any time pre-
fer. "A law," said the Court, "ca n n ot be general in any
correct sense of the term which by the reason of the exist-
ence" of a local option is repealed, or, what practically is
the same thing, has its vitality as a law suspended in one
locality, where exists a proper subject matter on which it
may operate, but remains in full force and vigor in another
locality of precisely the same kind; or in the same locality
is law or not law, as shall suit the changing fancies of the
local authority."'
. Regulations of police have, in certain States, been
governed by the same doctrine. Thus, in Pennsylvania an
act repealing a general fence law was held to. be local,
because it was limited to take effect only in such counties
as should vote for such repeal.2 In Iowa, where the con-
stitution provides that all laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation, and in Indiana, local option
liquor la'es have also been declared to be local, because
they allowed one system of police regulations to be adopted
in some localities and anothet in others (" a specious and
accommodating refinement of local legislation, annually
presenting to the townships an aspect suited to the taste of
each" ), the possibility that all localities might adopt the
same system being merely accidental and temporary.3 The
option was also held in these cases to be an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power, but there is no
reason to regard the expressions of opinion as to local
legislation as being mere dicta, especially as the Indiana
'People v. Cooper, 83 Ill., 585. The Court said in that case: "It is
the substance and nbt the mere form given to the enactment which must
determine its constitutionality. If the kct must necessarily produce a
result clearly and unquestionably forbidden by the constitution, it cannot
be upheld, whatever its form or profession. And, therefore, if the gen-
eral assembly should, by one or many enactments, authorize the incor-
poration of every city, every town, or every village with a distinct and
dissimilar organization and pTwer, such enactment or enactments would
be within the constitutional prohibition of ' local or special legislation,'
although having the form of general laws."
'Frost v. Cherry, 122 Pa., 417.
Maize v. State, 4 Ind., 342 ; Geebrick v. State, 5 Io., 491 ; see State
v. Weir, 33 id., 134.
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case has more recently been cited as to both points, appar-
ently with approval,' and the liquor license law subse-
quently upheld in Indiana was not a local option law, but
merely provided that every application for a license should
be backed by a petition signed by a majority of the legal
voters resident in the ward, town or township.
2
In New Jersey, however, it has been held that the
restrictions upon special and local legislation do not neces-
sitate uniform laws as to matters of police and local g9v-
ernment, as such laws would interfere with the proper
regulation of local affairs, and that as long as all cities or
other communities of the same class have the Sariie option
the law which provides for it must be regarded as general.'
The same view is taken in Missouri as to police regula-
tions,4 and in Illinois as to elections. 5 The New Jersey'
and Illinois courts ly considerable stress on the necessity.
of allowing ali option in regard to laws affecting local
matters. The New Jersey Court of Appeals has said, in
regard to a local option liquor law: "The delegation of
1 L. M. & B. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind., 227.
2 Groesch v. State, 42 Ind., 547.
3 Paul v. Gloucester Co., 5o N. J.'L., 585; Warner v. Hoagland, 5r
id., 66; in re Cleveland, 52 id., 188; affirming S. C., 51 id., 311. In
further application of the doctrine that if the option to adopt the law be
general'the law cannot be local, the Supreme Court held in in re Cleveland
that the limit of time within which the option had to be exercised did
not invalidate the law, because it was possible that all the cities might
vote to accept it within the time fixed, though this limit would tend to
create a permanently restricted class and so violate the prevailing doc-
trine as to classification. The Court of Appeals held that the facts of
the case did not raise this point, but, had that court passed upon it, it
would hardly have sustained the view of the Supreme Court.
4 State v. Pond, 93 Mo., 6o6, a case involving a law regulating
the sale of liquor. It is, however, held in Missouri that the option
granted must not involve such control over the operation of the law as
to amount to a delegation of legislative power. -Thus, where an act
authorized the voters. of any county, at an election held not more
than once a year and on the petition of three hundred freeholders,
to decide on restraining stock in the county, and provided that, if
the vote were in the affirmative, the county should be governed by
the act, this was held unconstitutional, as practically giving the voters of
each county a right each year to pass a local law for their own benefit:
Lammert v. Lidwell, 62 Mo., 188.
5 Peop. v. Hoffman, 116 Ill., 487.
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this police power necessarily implies the right 'to each
political district to regulate it in its own way or to prohibit
it. If the law must be absolute, unconditional and per-
emptory, if it must hold all to a like use of it, it is not a
delegation of any authority. The very object of delegat-
ing these powers is to enable the local government to make
use of diverse laws as they may deem expedient. Other-
wise the delegation is abortive. The inhibition in the
. constitution is not intended to secure uniformity in the
-,exercise of delegated police powers, but to forbid the pass-
ing of a law vesting in one town or county a power of local
g6vernment not granted to another. The quality"
of uniformity in result co-exists with the right of self-
government in various parts of the State."' In a case
which sustaihed an act vesting the construction and care
of roads, parks, sewers, etc., in the common council or
board of alderman of any city not of the first class whose
voters should elect to accept its provisions, the Supreme
'Court said: "It is not a constitutional requirement that
the laws regulating the internal affairs of cities shall be
uniform. The interdict uponf the legislature is that it shall
not pass local or special laws regulating the internal affairs
of municipalities. . . . It is self-evident that if the
legislature may submit a law for acceptance, a law based'
upon a valid classification, and submitted to all of the class
that may accept it is valid. Every law conferring discre-
tionary power may occasion diversities. The infirmity is
not in thi law: diversity arises from the application of it." 2
In a case where an act was upheld which empowered
the mayors of such cities as should adopt the act by 1popular
vote, to appoint certain municipal officers, the language
of the Court of Appeals was as follows: "That a law
granting municipal powers may be enacted to take
effect only on acceptance thereof by the people of the
municipality has been too firmly established in this
State to be a debatable question. In the nature and
theory of local government it seems to me that it must
'Paul v. Gloucester Co., 5o N.J. L., 585.
2 Warner v. Hoagland, 5I N. J. L., 66.
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necessarily be so. I cannot see how, upon principle, it
can make any difference whether the legislative enact-
ment gives every city power to appoint its officers in such
manner as it may elect, or provides a special mode for
appointmenft in every city that may choose to adopt it.
The latter is as absolute a d&claration of the legislative
will, and as complete a law, as the former. In the one
case as fully as in the other the legislative act confers upon
the people of the locality the power to select the local
officials. The vote does not make the law. It adopts the
mode of government which the law submits to acceptance.
The form in which it is presented for acceptanqe,
is wholly immaterial so long as it does not contravene the
organic law in respect to special or loal laws.
The object of. delegating powers is to enable local govern-
ments to make such diverse laws as they may deem expe-
dient. The grdnt of such powers implies that diversity is,
requisite. .- Uniformity of results cannot co-exist
with the right of local self-government until all men shall
be of one mind. No one will assert that an act is local or
special which gives to all the cities of the State the right
to establish by ordinance the mode in which their subor-
dinate officers shall be elected. Under sulch a statlite one
city might make the tenure of office a term of years
another during good behavior and a third at the will of
the common council. Such diverse results in the execu-
tion of the granted power obviously could not outlaw the
act of the legislature. The authority granted to all is the
same. The dissimilarity is in its use-a dissimilarity
inherent in the idea of local government. . . . A law
is equally free from objection which permits an election
between two specified modes of appointment."'
In re Cleveland, 52 N. J. L., 188. In the new territory of Oklahoma
it has recently been held that a local option herding law does not attempt
to regulate county or township affairs, but merely seeks to let the dis-
tricts manage their own affairs, and hence cannot be regarded as a local
law within the prohibition of the act regulating legislation in the Terri-
tories: Johnson v. Mocabee.(Okla.), 32 Pac. Rep., 336. It is hard to see
wherein a grant of permission to localities to regulate their own affairs
is not itself a regulation of their affairs.
• !
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In Illinois a law regulating elections in such cities,
villages and incorporated towns as should adopt it was held
to be general because of the possibility that all the cities
towns and villages in the State might accept its provisions,
and, in fact, to stand on the same ground as a municipal
corporation law obligatory upon cities, towns and villages
* . tlereafter incorporated, but only affecting those already
incorporated under special charters if they should accept
it. The Court said: "It being the settled policy of this
" State, both under the constitutions of 1848 and 1870, that
general laws, whether upon the subject of elections or
upon any other subject, may be in force in localities which
:vote to accept them, though not in force in localities
which do not vote to accept them, it necessarily follows that
there will be a want of uniformity between the law in force
in the adopting locality and the law in force in the non-
* adopting locality." '
The Court undertook to distinguish this case from that
of the tax-collection law already referred to, passed upon
in People v. Cooper.' The ground for that decision was
stated to be that the law there considered was not even
permanently obligatory upoln such cities as adopted it, so
that either its provisions or those of the existing law could
be valid in any city at any time, according as the councils
might wish, but the .doctrine of People v. Cooper clearly
went far beyond this, and the two cases are so irreconcilable
as to leave some doubt as to what the law of Illinois is as
to this point. The fundamental difference between the
election law and the municipal corporation law to which it
was compared was pointed out in the dissenting opinion,
viz., that in the latter case, no general law on the subject
being already in force, the adoption of the new act as far
as. itwent meant the substitution of one general law for
several special ones, whereas in the former case the new
law could only tend to make the old general law less
general.
I People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill., 487.
2 83 Ill-, 585, supra.
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The two views as to the effect of local option laws,
shown in the preceding pages, are irreconcilable, but one
cannot expect different cofistitutions to be interpreted in
exactly the same way in all matters, even if the language
is substantially identical. What a constitution means is
partly a question of fact, and it should not be hastily
assumed that a court of last resort has been mistaken as
to the facts which brought about the adoption of any part
of the constitution under which it acts. The several
courts may all be right as to the facts before them in each
case, however at variance their ultimate conclusions as to
the law.
At the same time it is- interesting to compare the
views of the different courts. By the law as now estab-
lished in New Jersey, the only check on separate legislation
for the different members of a class of municipal corpora-
tions or localities of any sort, is that it cannot be forced
upon them against their will; that they must be allowed
to choose in the matter
The reason for so slight a restriction is stated to be
the necessity of allowing local self-government, but it
must be observed that even under the New Jersey system
the right of local self-government is far from absolute. It
is so only where the people of a locality can govern- them-
selves exactly as they wish, without interference from any
legislature, constitution, or superior power whatever. The
prevailing American theory of local government does not
contemplate such a state of affairs. With us the people of the
whole State grant whatever right of local self-government
exists, either by the direct provisions of the constitution, or,
as is more usual, through the action of their representatives
in the legislature under the authority of the constitution.
The people of each locality are, even as regards their local
affairs, subordinate to the rule of the whole people" operat-
ing through the constitution and the legislature. The
legislature cannot impair whatever freedom of local govern-
ment the constitution grants, but neither can it extend
that freedom in violation of the rule imposed upon its
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action by the constitution itself. The unrestricted power
of special and local legislation, indeed, is destructive of all
local self-government. When a legislature can alter at will
any feature of local government, or can, for instance, direct
that a particular street be opened, or be paved in a par-
ticulat way, or that in a particular city a building shall be
constructhd at the cost of the city, the work to be under
the exclusive control of a commission not responsible to
the city, local self-government exists, if at all, by suffer-
aice only. The prohibition of special and local legislation
as to local affairs, therefore, aids local self-government to
this extent, that whatever rights of government or power
of regulating its own affairs a community may have can
be neither increased nor diminished without affecting in
the same way the power or rights of all similar communi-
ties, as is the law in Florida and Pennsylvania, or of all of
such communities that may consent to adopt the change,.
as is the law in New Jersey. In either case there can be
no discrimination among communities of the same sort,
for or against one or another. The law as established in
Pennsylvania does not mean that local government should
be of the same pattern everywhere, but it does mean that-
each form of it must be the same wherever the circum-
stances to which it is applicable are found. The right of
local self-government is not taken away by the require-
ments of general legislation, but the latter must be held
to control and restrict the former whenever the two are in
conflict.
In fact, what comes in conflict with the requirements
of general legislation in cases of this sort is not the right
of local self-government, but the power of a legislature to
establish various systems of local government for a single
class of communities, leaving each member of the class
free to adopt whichever system it may prefer. As, however,
the legislature could unquestionably at any time substitute
for these various systems one system obligatory upon all,
no greater right of local self-government independent of
legislative control exists under the law of New Jersey than
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under that of Pennsylvania. If, then, it be not local self-.
government that is at stake, but only the legislature's
power to pass laws which may create diversities of local
government in one class of places, do the prohibitions of
special and local legislation necessarily curtail this power?
This must depend upon whether these prohibitions be
intended'only to protect each community as far as possible
from the unwarranted intermeddling of the legislature in
its local affairs, or also to secure uniformity of local
government';in communities of the same class throughout
the State.
The Pennsylvania constitution as already stated, was
probably intended to go further in forbidding special legis-
lati6n than was that of New Jersey, and if -uniformity of
local government be desirable for.its own sake, the radical
system of Pennsylvania and Florida would seem productivd
of better results than the law as established in New Jersey.
The former certainly has the advantage of drawing a clear
and definite line between general and local legislation,
whereas by the latter the two must necessarily shade off
into each other, leaving a great deal to depend upon the
point of view of the count in each case. In fact, in the
dissenting opinion in Paul v. Gloucester Co.,' READ, J.,
did not hesitate to maintain that to allow a choice among
different systems of municipal government was, in reality,
nothing lesslthan special legislation, and contrary even to
the New Jersey constitution. " An act," he said, " general
in form, may be passed providing that all policemen shall
hold their terms for five years, another act that they shall
hold their offices at the will of the common council, and
still another that they shall hold during good behavior,
and so on in a dozen different shapes, but each act provides
that it shall not become operative in any city until accepted
by a majority of the votes of the people of said cities.
One city votes to accept one act, another city votes to
accept another act, and a third city still another act, and
so on until in each city there is a different law for each one
'50 N.J. L., 585, 630.
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of the classes. Each act, when so accepted, becomes part
of the charter of the accepting city. Now, what is true
of the operation of this rule in respect to the police branch
is true of any other branch, and so every other department
of a city's government may be organized by a law control-
ling the same department, but differing from that of any
other city. What more can be accomplished by any species
of local or special government? This doctrine leaves in
in full flower the noxious feature which the constitutional
provision was designed to extirpate. It leaves the same
endless variety of charters to be construed, and relieves
the body of legislators from all legislative responsibility."
At the same time,' it must be admitted that, even as
to powers of government, while the Pennsylvania doct ine
would, from a strictly legal point of view, seem the more
in accord with. both the letter and spirit of the constitu-
-tional restrictions, the system of local option has some
very practical advantages. It does, unquestionably, happen
at times that one locality may rightly desire a. measure
which another locality of the same class may conceive to
be contrary to its interests and would strenuously oppose.
In such a case, whether the law be passed or not, one
locality feels its int&rests sacrificed to those of the other,
whereas if the law affected only the locality that chose to
accept it, both would be satisfied.
In a former article a distinction was noticed between
the views held by the courts of New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania in regard to the meaning of their respective consti-
tutions as affecting classification for the purpose of general
legislation, and the divergence of doctrine as to .local
option would seem to have some connection with that dis-
tinction. The matter may, in fact, be regarded as one of
classification. A law, the extent of whose operation
depends upon a local option, recognizes, or rather estab-
lishes, two classes, the l6calities which vote one way and
those which vote the other way, and provides separate
legislation for each; one class being established by law
just as completely as is the other. In Pennsylvania
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population is the only basis of classification that has been
-approved in regard to matters of local government, and a
popular vote or a municipal ordinance would probably be
-egarded as a basis not sufficiently germane to the legisla-
tion sought, while in New Jersey the courts take a much
-broader view of what is allowable as a basis of classifica-
tion, and might be disposed even to recognize a vote or.
ordinance as such basis. The limited option as to powers
of government allowtd in Pennsylvania (the right to accept
the provisions of a general law or not) is really outside the
rule when regarded from this point of view, just as. it is -
from any other. It grows out of the existence of previous:
-local legislation, which the constitution did not undertake "
to disturb, and it is capable of exercise only in the direc-
tion of. general legislation. What the legislature does in
'such a case is to form a. new class, on a proper basis, which
-will eventually absorb all the members to which that basis
.applies, though it does not include them at first.
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